What do the changes to the FIFA RSTP mean for players?

What do the changes to the FIFA RSTP mean for players?
Views Football Disputes

Introduction

On 10 June 2026, FIFA published a new edition of its Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (the “RSTP”), which will enter into force on 1 January 2027.

This represents the first significant update to the RSTP since January 2025, when FIFA published an interim edition following the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (“CJEU”) landmark decision in the Diarra case – which we covered in our previous articles Diarra vs FIFA’s RSTP – Bosman 2.0? and The Diarra Reforms: FIFA’s Interim Regulatory Framework.

The January 2027 RSTP are the product of negotiations between FIFA, players, players’ unions, clubs and leagues, and Article 1(3) of the new regulations provides that any amendments going forward will require the agreement of those stakeholders.

FIFA has characterised the changes as “the most significant reform of the FIFA RSTP since its adoption in 2001”. This article summarises the key changes – namely, enhanced protection for players against abusive conduct by clubs, revised rules governing the consequences of a breach of contract, the extension of maximum contract lengths for minor players in certain circumstances, and express provision for player participation in transfer fees – and explains the practical implications for players.

 

Article 14: Enhanced protection for players against abusive conduct by clubs

Article 14(2) of the RSTP currently provides that any abusive conduct by a party aimed at forcing the counterparty to terminate or change the terms of a contract entitles the counterparty to terminate the contract with just cause.

The new edition of the RSTP retains this provision, but also introduces a new Article 14(3), which particularises abusive conduct by clubs.

Under the new Article 14(3), clubs must not:

  1. “Abuse the  registration or deregistration of a player as a means of pressure” (for example, by refusing to register, or threatening to deregister, a player, to pressure them into accepting unfavourable contract terms);
  2. “Separate a player in an abusive manner from training with the team” (i.e. so-called ‘bomb squad’ practices);
  3. “Withhold a passport from a player”; or
  4. “Unduly evict a player from their home”.

If such conduct occurs, the player will be entitled to terminate their contract with just cause.

In practice, the FIFA Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”) have previously held that such conduct by a club justifies termination of their contract by a player. The new Article 14(3) therefore merely codifies existing FIFA and CAS jurisprudence.

Nevertheless, its express inclusion in the RSTP brings welcome certainty to the circumstances in which players will be entitled to terminate their contracts and thereby enhances players’ rights.

 

Article 17: Consequences of a breach of contract

Article 17 of the RSTP, which governs the consequences of a breach of contract, has been reformulated.

Agreed compensation

First, a new Article 17(1) has been introduced, which addresses agreed compensation. It provides that:

Parties are free to contractually agree on the financial compensation payable in the event of a breach of contract (the “agreed compensation”), subject to the following:

  1. The agreement does not have to be reciprocal.
  2. The Football Tribunal shall reduce an agreed compensation with restraint and only if it is excessively high. It shall disregard an agreed compensation if it is manifestly unfair.
  3. For players earning a yearly fixed remuneration of up to USD 150,000 (or its equivalent), any agreement on the financial compensation payable to the player must, as a minimum, grant the player a payment equal to the residual value of the contract that was breached, unless exceptional circumstances justify a lower amount.

Some reports have suggested that the new Article 17(1) introduces mandatory buyout clauses in player contracts. However, this is incorrect.

Under the current RSTP, players and clubs have discretion as to whether to include liquidated damages clauses – i.e. provisions that set out in advance the amount of compensation payable if a specific type of breach occurs – in their contracts.

The new Article 17(1) therefore largely codifies existing FIFA Football Tribunal and CAS jurisprudence, which has long recognised the validity of such clauses – even if they are non-reciprocal – and enforced them without reduction, save where they are excessive or manifestly unfair.

The principal change is therefore the introduction of the USD 150,000 or less fixed remuneration rule, which provides a protective floor for liquidated damages clauses in lower-earning players’ contracts. It is worth reiterating, however, that this protection only applies where the contract contains a clause regarding the financial compensation payable to the player in the event of breach by the club.

Criteria for calculating compensation for breach of contract when it is not agreed

Second, the criteria for calculating compensation for breach of contract when compensation has not been contractually agreed have been refined.

The RSTP currently provides that compensation is “calculated taking into account the damage suffered, according to the ‘positive interest’ principle, having regard to the individual facts and circumstances of each case, and with due consideration for the law of the country concerned”. The ‘positive interest’ principle requires that the amount of compensation should put the injured party in the position they would have been but for the breach of contract.

The current RSTP further provides that:

  • Where a player has not signed a new contract following the termination of their previous contract, compensation must, as a general rule, be equal to the residual value of the contract that was prematurely terminated.
  • ·Where a player has signed a new contract, the value of the new contract for the period corresponding to the time remaining on the prematurely terminated contract must be deducted from the residual value of the prematurely terminated contract.

 The January 2027 edition of the RSTP now provides that:

  • Article 17(3): A player shall be awarded full compensation for the damage caused by the breach. Depending on the circumstances of each case, this damage shall take into account, in particular, the residual value of the contract that was breached, and any other damage caused.
  • Article 17(4): A club shall be awarded full compensation for the damage caused by the breach. Depending on the circumstances of each case, this damage shall take into account, in particular, the value of the services of the player, a lost transfer fee or lost transfer value, replacement costs, and any other damage caused.
  • Article 17(5): As a principle, a player and a club shall always be awarded, as a minimum, an amount equal to the residual value of the contract that was breached. Only in extraordinary circumstances can the amount of compensation awarded be lower than the residual value.
  • Article 17(7): The party suffering damage from a breach of contract has the duty to mitigate their damage, subject to Article 17(5).

It remains to be seen how FIFA and CAS will apply these refined criteria. However, the new criteria do not differ significantly from the previous ones, and the residual value of the prematurely terminated contract remains fundamental to the calculation of compensation.

The most notable takeaways for players are:

  1. Notwithstanding that players and clubs still have a duty to mitigate their damages, the new Articles 17(5) and 17(7) suggest that compensation for breach of contract will be at least equivalent to the residual value of the contract, save in exceptional cases. This marks a departure from the previous regime, which made clear that the value of a player’s new contract for the period corresponding to the time remaining on the prematurely terminated contract would always be deducted from the residual value to determine compensation. This has the potential to benefit players, as their compensation will seemingly no longer be reduced by the signing of a new contract. However, in cases where players are ordered to pay compensation to clubs, it could result in players having to pay greater amounts — for example, if the actual damage suffered by a club is less than the residual value of the contract.
  2. Players can be ordered to compensate clubs for, inter alia, “a lost transfer fee or lost transfer value, replacement costs, and any other damage caused”. The compensation that is potentially payable by players to clubs is thus very broad. This seems to be at odds with the decision in Diarra, where the CJEU held that taking into account the costs and expenditure borne by a club when a player was transferred to it, amortised over the term of the contract, is “particularly excessive”. It thus seems likely that this issue will continue to give rise to disputes.

The presumption of inducement and joint and several liability

Third, both the current and new editions of the RSTP provide that a player’s new club will be jointly and severally liable for a player’s breach of contract with their former club if the new club induced the breach.

However, Article 17(11) of the January 2027 RSTP creates the following rebuttable presumption:

“...if the player signs a new contract within 45 days of a breach of contract by the player, it shall be presumed that the new club induced the player to breach the contract”.

Notably, in Diarra, the CJEU found that a presumption that a player’s new club induced a breach of contract was unlawful. Presumably, FIFA considers that the new 45-day limit remedies the illegality.

However, the re-introduction of the presumption of inducement may lead to new clubs being hesitant to sign players within 45 days of leaving their former club, particularly if a player’s exit involved or potentially involved a breach of contract, as the new club will potentially be liable for any compensation the player is ordered to pay their former club.

Sporting sanctions for clubs

Fourth, one of the lesser publicised but perhaps most significant changes relates to sporting sanctions for clubs.

Currently, any club found to have breached a contract during the protected period (see further below) was subject to a transfer ban for two registration periods (i.e. transfer windows).

However, Article 17(10) of the January 2027 edition replaces this with a repeat-offending system operating within a two-year rolling window. A first breach results in only a warning and a fine. A second breach within two years leads to a limitation preventing registration of more than five new players for one registration period. A third breach within two years triggers a full registration ban for one registration period, and a fourth breach within two years results in a ban for two consecutive registration periods. Where there are aggravating circumstances, the more severe sanctions may be imposed directly.

In practice, this new approach may make clubs more willing to terminate contracts in certain circumstances, as the consequences are now comparatively lighter – although clubs remain liable to pay compensation for any wrongful termination.

The protected period

Fifth, the definition of the protected period has been amended.

Under the current rules, the protected period was defined as three entire seasons or three years (whichever came first) for contracts concluded before the player’s 28th birthday, and two entire seasons or two years for contracts concluded after that birthday.

Under the new rules, where a contract is signed by a player prior to their 23rd birthday, the protected period is four entire seasons or four years, whichever comes first. Where the player is aged 23 to 27 at the date of signing, the protected period is the first of three entire seasons or three years. For a player aged 28 to 31, the protected period reduces to the first of two entire seasons or two years. Finally, where the contract is signed by a player on or after their 32nd birthday, the protected period is the first of a single entire season or one year.

This change is important because players who are found to have breached their contracts within the protected period are subject to a sporting sanction, namely a four-month restriction on playing in official matches, which can be extended to six months in the case of aggravating circumstances.

 

Article 18(2): Longer contracts for minor players

The RSTP currently provides that a player under the age of 18 may not sign a professional contract for a term longer than three years.

Article 18(2) of the new RSTP retains that general rule but adds an exception which allows players under 18 to sign a professional contract for a term of up to five years if the player has been registered at a club for 20 months or two consecutive competition periods (whichever is shorter), provided that such contracts are not prohibited by national law or a valid domestic collective bargaining agreement.

Clubs are only permitted to sign five such contracts per season and the contracts must provide for specified fixed-remuneration increases in years 4 and 5 – which are, in part, linked to the number of appearances made by a player – unless a valid domestic collective bargaining agreement requires otherwise.

The potential benefits of this change for players are twofold. First, it is likely to enable some young players to secure longer-term contracts earlier in their careers, which will provide greater financial security during a key developmental phase. Second, the specified fixed-remuneration increases in years 4 and 5 of the contract effectively constitute minimum guaranteed salary increases.

However, the change could limit players’ ability to move clubs if they outgrow their current club or if circumstances otherwise change. It could also lead to a suppression of young players’ wages, as longer contracts reduce the opportunities for renegotiation.

It is important to note that the new Article 18(2) does not make five-year contracts mandatory, and players retain freedom to negotiate the length of their contracts, subject to the minimum and maximum requirements provided for in the RSTP. Therefore, players and their advisors will need to carefully consider what length of contract best suits their circumstances and ambitions.


Article 21bis: Player participation in transfer fees

Finally, the January 2027 RSTP contains a new Article 21bis governing player participation in transfer fees.

The new rule expressly permits clubs and players to agree that the player will receive a percentage of any transfer fee paid for the player, or an amount equivalent thereto. This practice was not prohibited under prior editions of the RSTP and player participation in transfer fees has happened in previous cases. However, the express provision for player participation in transfer fees in the new edition may encourage the practice to be adopted more broadly.

The new rule also provides that, where a player earning less than EUR 150,000 per year in fixed remuneration from their releasing club is the subject of a permanent international transfer, the releasing club must pay the player an amount equal to 5% of the total fixed transfer fee received.

This represents a meaningful development for lower-earning players, as it enables them to automatically benefit from the transfer fee paid when they move clubs.

However, the practical impact of this new rule should not be overstated. The mandatory entitlement only applies to players earning less than EUR 150,000 per year in fixed remuneration. Players in this earnings bracket are often transferred for minimal fees or move on free transfers, meaning the 5% payment may be modest in absolute terms.

In addition, players entitled to the mandatory 5% participation can agree to partially waive that entitlement. In practice, clubs may pressure players to accept a partial waiver in order to facilitate the transfer, potentially undermining the protective purpose of the provision.

 

Conclusion

In the authors’ view, the new edition of the RSTP is not as transformative as FIFA has suggested. Many of the changes merely codify existing jurisprudence or represent incremental adjustments to the regulatory framework.

Further, whilst the formal recognition of FIFPRO’s involvement in the amendment of the RSTP is an important step forward for player representation, this may make it more difficult for players to challenge the more restrictive elements of the RSTP which remain, moving forward.

Nevertheless, the new regulations will significantly impact players and clubs going forward. Players, clubs and their advisors would therefore be well advised to familiarise themselves with the changes ahead of their entry into force on 1 January 2027 and plan accordingly.

Morgan Sports Law has significant experience advising players and clubs on compliance with the RSTP and acting in contractual disputes before the FIFA Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Please contact Ben Cisneros or Sam Kasoulis with any enquiries.

 

Authored by

Ben Cisneros
Associate

Sam Kasoulis
Associate

Footnote

1. In July 2025, FIFA published a slightly revised edition of the RSTP, which extended the temporary regulatory framework related to the war in Ukraine by a further year.

2. See, for example: (a) CAS 2024/A/11061 Club Persib Bandung v. Daisuke Sato & Davao Aguilas UMAK FC at ¶¶ 95 and 96; (b) FPSD-16288 Fode Camara v. Club Sportif Sfaxien at ¶ 58; (c) FPSD-13754 Ahmed Ayman Shamsaldin v. Jabal at ¶ 58; and (d) 20-01641 Yaya Kone v. Arar Club at ¶¶ 29-31.

3. Article 1(3) of the new RSTP – which provides for perhaps the most significant change: that any future amendments to the RSTP will require the agreement of players, players’ unions, clubs and leagues – may in practice insulate the RSTP from further legal challenges by players and other stakeholders because FIFA claims the new RSTP is a collective bargaining agreement, and such agreements are generally exempt from the application of EU competition law, which has been one the key grounds of challenge to the restrictive aspects of the RSTP, for example in Diarra.