Cycling’s breakaway moment: One Cycling and the limits of the UCI’s authority

What is One Cycling?

One Cycling, described as a kind of “super league” for road racing, is a proposed new race series backed by several leading teams (including Visma LAB and Ineos) and major race organisers such as Flanders Classics.

With a reported EUR 250 million investment from SRJ Sports Investments (owned by the Saudi Public Investment Fund), the project aims to reduce the sport’s reliance on sponsorship and reshape how elite racing is commercialised. But with few public details and an ambitious remit, it remains to be seen whether it is the future of the sport, a disruptive threat, or (perhaps) both.

Last month, however, the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) rejected One Cycling’s request to be included in the official UCI WorldTour calendars through 2028. The UCI’s Management Committee unanimously deemed the project “incompatible with the governance and regulatory framework of the UCI” and “lacking sporting coherence”. 1 

Although the UCI initially stated that it would continue discussions with the project’s backers, the immediate refusal was widely seen as a major setback – and the UCI’s stance soon hardened. Weeks later, UCI President David Lappartient sent an email to teams and organisers involved in One Cycling, putting them “on notice”. He warned that any WorldTour teams or events pressing ahead with the breakaway risked having their UCI licences or race registrations withdrawn. 2 

The message was unambiguous, and the One Cycling project is now clearly in jeopardy. The UCI for its part insists that “nothing can or will be done without the entire cycling family and the UCI”.

What began as a bid to modernise has escalated into a standoff. One Cycling’s proponents see opportunity; the UCI sees a threat to its authority. The central legal question is, of course, whether the UCI’s refusal to include One Cycling on the WorldTour calendar and its threat to withdraw licenses from those who participate may breach competition law.

Relevance of competition law

The past five years have seen an explosion of competition law cases in sport, as significant new investment has given rise to a plethora of so-called breakaway competitions across a variety of sports.

Professional golf, football, tennis, ice skating, snooker, basketball and martial arts are among the sports to have faced such challenges, in the EU, US and UK, as existing governing bodies have sought to maintain control over their sports and new entrants have sought to revolutionise them.

Several of those cases are ongoing, but the emerging jurisprudence within the EU (and, to some extent, the UK) makes clear that competition law places significant limits on the powers of the regulators to control the emergence of breakaway leagues and that efforts by governing bodies to stifle such events may well be unlawful.

For example, in International Skating Union (ISU) v. Commission, 3 the CJEU found that the ISU’s eligibility rules, which punished athletes for competing in unauthorised events, violated EU competition law. The court emphasised that the ISU’s rules lacked transparent, objective and non‑discriminatory authorisation criteria and imposed disproportionate penalties.

The CJEU reached the same conclusion in European Superleague v. FIFA and UEFA 4, finding that a prior approval regime for new competitions combined with the threat of sanctions, which lacked procedural safeguards, also violated competition law.

The UCI’s conduct raises similar concerns. Although the UCI does not organise WorldTour races, it controls the calendar, issues team licences, and oversees the regulation of the sport. That gives it total power over who can access the top level of professional road cycling, and gives it market-shaping authority, even if it is not a commercial organiser.

By refusing to approve One Cycling’s race series and threatening to withdraw licences from those who participate, it risks deterring market entry, protecting its own competition structure, and thus distorting competition.

Jurisdiction

Although the UCI is based in Switzerland, its conduct has foreseeable effects within both the EU and UK markets. Under EU law, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be asserted where the conduct has immediate, substantial and foreseeable effects within the internal market. That test is arguably met here. The One Cycling project involves teams, events and broadcasters based across Europe, and any decision by the UCI to block or deter participation would affect competition within the EU.

A similar position applies in the United Kingdom. Following Brexit, the UK is no longer subject to EU institutions, but the relevant provisions of the UK Competition Act 1998 mirror the relevant provisions of EU law. 5

The Competition and Markets Authority may investigate conduct affecting trade within the UK even if the underlying decision was taken abroad, and private enforcement remains available through the courts and Competition Appeal Tribunal. While procedural divergence from the EU is possible, the legal standard remains substantively the same.

In short, the UCI’s conduct may be subject to legal challenge under both regimes. Any attempt to sanction or exclude British teams or organisers for involvement in One Cycling would likely engage UK competition law on the same basis as EU competition law is engaged.

What principles of EU / UK competition law are engaged?

The relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are Articles 101 and 102, and their UK domestic equivalents under the Competition Act 1998 (Chapters I and II).

Article 101 prohibits agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.

In the sporting context, this would apply to rules adopted by a governing body that limit the freedom of teams, organisers or athletes to participate in competing events. Notably, in both the International Skating Union and European Superleague cases referenced above, the CJEU found that the sports governing bodies rules violated Article 101 of the TFEU, by object.

Given the UCI’s refusal to approve One Cycling’s race series, and the threat to withdraw licences from anyone who participates, it is arguable that Article 101 has been breached in the same manner here.

 

A restriction is said to be by object if it is inherently anti-competitive, such that its purpose alone is sufficient to infringe Article 101 without any need to examine its actual effects.

A restriction is by effect if it does not have an obviously anti-competitive aim but, in practice, produces negative consequences for competition. This requires an assessment of the actual or likely impact of the rule or agreement, including whether it reduces choice, raises barriers to entry, or distorts market structure.

 

Article 102 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. This includes conduct by a dominant undertaking that excludes or deters competitors, imposes unfair trading conditions, or discriminates between counterparties without objective justification.

In the context of sport, this may include denying access to essential regulatory approvals or imposing sanctions in a manner that distorts competitive conditions. Thus, it is arguable that the UCI’s conduct in relation to One Cycling may also engage Article 102.

 

Dominant Undertaking

United Brands Company v Commission (Case 27/76), para 65:

“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”

Abuse

European Superleague Company SL v FIFA and UEFA (Case C 333/21), para 125:

“any practice which, on a market where the degree of competition is already weakened precisely because of the presence of one or more undertakings in a dominant position, through recourse to means different from those governing normal competition between undertakings, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition”

 

Possible justifications?

In Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission 6 it was held that rules governing sport may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) if they pursue a legitimate sporting objective and are both inherent in and proportionate to achieving that aim. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘sporting exception’, but it is not a blanket ‘get out of jail free’ card for sports institutions.

 

Meca-Medina test:

1.     Does the rule pursue a legitimate sporting objective?

2.     Is it inherent in achieving that objective?

3.     Is it proportionate (i.e. goes no further than necessary)?

 

The Meca-Medina exception is not available where the restriction is anti-competitive by object. 7 The UCI’s actions here may well be a exactly that.

As discussed above, its refusal to include One Cycling’s races, combined with threats of licence withdrawal, appears designed to suppress a competing structure. In both ISU and Superleague, similar conduct was held to infringe Article 101 by object because it was discretionary, lacked objective criteria, and imposed deterrent sanctions on would-be participants.

The UCI Regulations (Part II, Chapter XV, Articles 2.15.144 to 2.15.159) do set out a process for calendar inclusion, including a list of qualitative selection criteria to be applied by the Professional Cycling Council (Article 2.15.147), but those criteria are largely discretionary, lack objective weighting, and short of an appeal to the CAS 8, there is no mechanism for independent review.  One Cycling would therefore appear to have a reasonable argument that the UCI’s actions are similarly a restriction by object, such that they cannot be justified.

In any event, even were the UCI’s conduct to be considered a restriction of competition ‘by effect’, One Cycling and/or any sanctioned participants would seem to have a reasonable argument that the UCI’s actions are not proportionate in pursuit of the (apparent) legitimate objective of effectively organising the sport.

Nevertheless, even where justification under the Meca-Medina approach is unavailable, a restriction ‘by object’ under Article 101(1) may still be exempt under Article 101(3) as that applies to both object and effect restrictions. However, it seems that the four strict cumulative conditions in Article 101(3) are unlikely to be met here:

 

Exemption under Article 101(3):

1. The restriction improves production, distribution, or promotes technical/economic progress;
2. It allows consumers a fair share of those benefits;
3. It does not go beyond what is indispensable to achieve the benefits;
4. It does not eliminate competition in a substantial part of the market.

As regards Article 102, justification follows a different framework, whereby dominant undertakings may raise objective justifications for conduct that would otherwise amount to abuse. The CJEU has accepted this defence in narrow cases where the conduct:

 

Justification under Article 102:

• is objectively necessary (e.g. for safety or integrity) 9, or
• produces efficiencies that outweigh the restriction, provided these cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. 10

Here, the UCI may argue that excluding One Cycling is necessary to maintain regulatory coherence or competitive integrity. But any such justification must be backed by clear evidence and must demonstrate that no less restrictive alternatives were available. The absence of published reasoning, coupled with the threat to revoke license (arguably disproportionate and exclusionary rather than objectively necessary) undermines this defence. Its conduct therefore also appears to give rise to an arguable abuse under Article 102.

 

What could happen next?

The UCI has drawn its line its line in the sand. Whether this escalates to a formal legal fight will depend on what One Cycling and its proponents want, and what they are willing to risk. There are several possible next steps:

• Regulatory complaint. A competition complaint against the UCI is already pending before the European Commission by the organiser of the Hammer race series, Velon. That complaint raises fundamentally the same issue as there: that the UCI used licensing and sanctions to suppress competing formats. One Cycling’s backers could lodge a similar complaint, forcing the Commission or the CMA (or both) to investigate.
• Litigation. One Cycling or its supporters could initiate proceedings alleging a breach of competition law and seek an injunction in a national court (whether in the EU or the UK, or both). The Superleague clubs did exactly that in Spain, securing interim protection while the case progressed.
• Arbitration. Any decision of the UCI Management Committee, can be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Although not a specialist competition law tribunal, it is entirely open to parties to advance competition law arguments before the CAS (though post Seraing, any CAS decision would be reviewable by the EU courts).

Conclusion

Under both EU and UK law, the UCI’s conduct gives rise to serious and arguably unlawful restrictions on competition. Its refusal to approve One Cycling’s race series as part of the WorldTour calendar, coupled with threats to revoke licences, mirrors conduct already condemned in ISU and Superleague (amongst others). The legal framework is clear. The only real question now is whether anyone will force the issue.

 

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1. https://www.cyclingweekly.com/news/uci-rejects-one-cycling-project-as-incompatible-and-lacking-sporting-coherence
2. https://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-puts-one-cycling-on-notice-in-letter-warning-teams-and-organisers-they-could-lose-their-licences/
3. International Skating Union v Commission (Case T‑93/18, upheld in Case C‑124/21 P),
4. European Superleague Company SL v FIFA and UEFA (Case C‑333/21)
5. See Chapter I (Agreements) and Chapter II (Abuse of Dominant Position) Competition Act 1998
6. Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission (Case C-519/04 P)
7. European Superleague Company SL v FIFA and UEFA (Case C‑333/21), at para. 186
8. Under Article 73 of the UCI Constitution 2025
9. Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission (Case 85/76); United Brands v Commission (Case 27/76):
10.  Intel v Commission (Case C‑413/14 P)