Addressing the Inequality of Arms in Anti-Doping Proceedings

Addressing the Inequality of Arms in Anti-Doping Proceedings
Views Anti-Doping

Anti-doping cases often make the headlines, but one aspect of anti-doping cases that is seldom discussed is the enormous imbalance in financial power.

On one side are national and international anti-doping organisations (ADOs) with annual budgets often exceeding tens of millions of dollars, funded by governments and sports governing bodies.

On the other side are 2,000+ athletes who test positive annually, most of whom have no legal budget at all.

Most anti-doping cases therefore end up being total mismatches, as athletes are generally not financially equipped to properly defend themselves.

This article explores the scale of that imbalance and potential ways to address it. Those suggestions are certainly not exhaustive, but they are intended as a starting point for discussion about how anti-doping proceedings can be made fairer.

 

The numbers

To put the imbalance into context:

In contrast, most athletes facing an anti-doping charge must finance their own defence, often without any insurance, union support, or institutional safety net.

Of course, some athletes are very wealthy and can afford the best legal teams. Paul Pogba and Maria Sharapova are names that spring to mind, for example.

Those are, however, a tiny minority of the athlete population.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average annual wage for U.S. “athletes and sports competitors” was $62,360 as of May 2024.

The average salary for British athletes has been reported by different sources as approximately £26,000 to £32,000 – with the UK minimum wage also falling within this range.

 

The cost of legal proceedings

Anti-doping proceedings can be very complex. Right at the outset of a case, athletes are faced with a mountain of legal documentation. Within the WADA ecosystem, that includes:

  1. The WADA Code and associated WADA documents that run to hundreds of pages.
  2. Decades’ worth of legal cases. Since the WADA Code first came into force in 2004, thousands of anti-doping cases have been determined at national and international level. Many of those past cases – particularly those determined by the Court of Arbitration for Sport – are used to interpret aspects of the WADA Code and its associated documents. 

If that is not daunting enough for athletes, then consider that anti-doping proceedings are often also as much about science as they are about the law:

  1. Once an athlete tests positive for a banned substance, they can request the Laboratory Documentation Package (LDP) that relates to their sample analysis. The LDP sets out the steps taken during the analysis and the test results. The LDP reveals whether testing was conducted properly and can often also yield clues as to the source of the substance detected. However, it runs into dozens of pages of scientific terminology, calculations and graphs, that can typically only be properly interpreted by expert scientists.
  2. Anti-doping testing has become so incredibly sensitive that testing often picks up infinitesimal amounts of a substance. If the athlete did not knowingly take the substance, then determining where it came from can be a painstaking, and very costly, process. In many cases, finding a needle in a haystack would be a considerably easier task.

ADOs are increasingly treating anti-doping cases as though they are commercial litigation cases. Proceedings have become so complex that case management conferences and multi-day hearings are now commonplace (just as in commercial litigation). Famously, UK Anti-Doping spent almost three years and £577,717 pursuing Tyson Fury for an alleged positive test, before settling the case

If athletes are to properly defend themselves, the costs of doing so can quickly escalate into tens of thousands of pounds, particularly where scientific investigations and/or experts are required. A full-blooded, no-stones-left-unturned defence in a highly contested and complex case can stretch into six or even seven figures in extreme cases. That is even without considering the costs of any appeal. Those are terrifying and entirely unaffordable numbers for most athletes.

 

Young athletes and athletes from developing nations are hit hardest

The imbalance is even more acute for young athletes and those from developing nations. In our experience, those athletes are less likely to have access to experienced lawyers, agents, or federations willing to step in with funding. In addition to having to navigate through a horribly complex legal process, they will often also have to do so in a second language.

In short, more established athletes and those from wealthier countries are more likely to find support when problems arise. For others, a single positive test – even if inadvertent – is more likely to spell the end of their careers, not because they have necessarily done anything wrong, but because they do not have the means to defend themselves.

 

The financial imbalance of appeals

First instance proceedings in anti-doping cases can be expensive and emotionally draining for athletes. But succeeding at first instance is often not the end. The opposing ADO at first instance, other relevant ADOs (such as the athlete’s National Anti-Doping Organisation or their International Federation) and WADA usually have the right to appeal. This means that an athlete who has already invested significant time, money, and energy defending themselves may then face an appeal from a new, fully funded opponent. In some cases, the outcome of an appeal (e.g. a national-level appeal decision) can itself be appealed, which means an athlete may have to face – and fund – three separate rounds of proceedings, each time against a new opponent.

By contrast, if an athlete loses at first instance and wants to appeal, they are usually on their own. The result is a form of procedural unfairness, where an athlete who succeeds once must find new resources to defend themselves against any appeal, often after already exhausting their finances, and one who loses at first instance can only rely on themselves for any appeal. Either way, it’s often one athlete with limited means against a tag team of regulators, backed by big budgets.

 

The perception of a two-tiered system

Of course, not all athletes are under-resourced. Some are wealthy and can afford to instruct the best lawyers and scientific experts. When a high-profile athlete is embroiled in anti-doping proceedings and successfully clears their name, it is often through meticulous (but expensive) legal and scientific work.

Those types of cases often give rise to a perception of a 'two-tiered' system, where wealthy athletes “buy” justice and the rest are left behind.

There is some truth to that perception, but the injustice does not lie in the fact that wealthier athletes can defend themselves effectively. The real unfairness is that poorer athletes cannot.

 

Pro bono: a well-intentioned but inadequate fix

In some jurisdictions, athletes will have the option of instructing pro bono counsel, who typically are not anti-doping specialists. Some of these are highly skilled advocates in their chosen areas of law, who sacrifice their time to assist athletes at no cost.  

While well-intentioned, pro bono counsel often find themselves at a disadvantage because they are either assisting on an anti-doping case for the first time or can only dip in and out of anti-doping cases as and when their regular caseload allows them to take on a pro bono case.  They are typically up against ADO lawyers who specialise in anti-doping proceedings, who know the anti-doping rules inside out, have access to a bank of anti-doping caselaw – some of which may not be public – and who often also know the arbitrators that adjudicate the cases, which may give the ADO some insight into how to approach the proceedings in a manner that will favour them.

While pro bono services can be useful in simple cases, they are rarely the solution for complex cases. Anti-doping is a specialised field that demands knowledge of both highly specific legal frameworks and, often, complex science.  Inadequate scientific investigations, failing to spot flawed testing, or not knowing of a nuance to the applicable rules that is borne of years of caselaw could mean the difference between a four-year ban and a total exoneration.

Even when good pro bono legal support is available, it rarely addresses the scientific complexity at the heart of many anti-doping cases. In cases that require substantial scientific support, legal arguments are only as strong as the expert evidence behind them. Yet there are very few scientific experts globally with the expertise and experience necessary to meaningfully contribute to anti-doping cases – and fewer still who are willing or able to offer their services on a pro bono basis. As a result, even athletes with volunteer legal representation can find themselves at a serious disadvantage if they cannot afford to instruct expert scientists. Without such expertise, they may lack the critical evidence needed to mount an effective defence.

In short, while pro bono support can undoubtedly be useful for athletes without a budget, it is papering over the cracks.

 

Other ad hoc solutions

Ad hoc funding options are occasionally available to athletes. For instance, some athletes are able to obtain assistance from friends, family or private sponsors. 

In some cases, sports governing bodies will themselves offer (limited) assistance.  For example, the ITIA announced last year that it will trial a new programme whereby it will offer athletes who test positive for a banned substance up to USD $5,000 to test products at a WADA-accredited laboratory, or to assist with identifying sources of potential meat contamination.

That is a commendable initiative, and one that other sports ought to consider implementing, but those funds will quickly exhaust if – for example – an athlete is seeking  to collect and test meat samples from South America and/or Asia (where so many of the meat contamination cases arise) or otherwise to conduct experiments or instruct scientific experts to prove their innocence (if such experimentation or expert instruction are even within scope of the $5,000 budget).

It will be interesting to see how easily athletes can actually access those funds for their investigations and whether other sports will follow suit.

As useful as those ad hoc solutions are, they do not go far enough to redress the imbalance and are typically only available to a tiny proportion of the affected athletes.

So, what is the solution?

 

A fair funding model

The starting point is that a systemic solution is required – i.e. ad hoc funding for athletes is helpful, but more helpful would be a permanent solution that can apply to the entire population of athletes that are subject to anti-doping rules.

Two solutions typically spring to mind whenever the topic is raised, but neither has (yet) proven viable:

  1. Athlete unions: As helpful as they can often be, athlete unions rarely have enough resources to fund themselves, still less to fund athlete defences on a systematic basis. Funding therefore needs to come from somewhere else.
  2. Insurance: To our knowledge, there is no insurance product that covers an athlete’s legal defence against anti-doping charges. Our own attempts at persuading insurance companies to develop such a product have been unsuccessful. The general message has been that the market is too niche and/or too difficult to market to. It is, in my view, a potentially lucrative market for an entrepreneurial insurance firm and a product worth developing. Be that as it may, athletes and their representatives cannot sit and hope that such a product is going to be developed or that it will have sufficient global reach to benefit a substantial proportion of the athlete population.  

So, if athlete unions and insurance products are not the answer, what is?

Before answering that question, it is important to understand this: the outcome of an anti-doping case in one sport can affect the outcome of an anti-doping case in another sport. To explain:

(a)   all sports that fall under the WADA Code regime apply virtually identical anti-doping rules;

(b)   though there is no formal system of binding precedents, panels of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) tend to prefer remaining consistent with the decisions of past CAS panels on broadly similar issues (regardless of sporting discipline);

(c)    thus, a decision made in one WADA Code compliant sport has the potential to affect the outcome of a case in another WADA Code compliant sport. That could happen in any number of ways – for example, a CAS finding made in a case in relation to the manner in which a particular rule should be interpreted or in relation to a point of principle (e.g. the application of the principle of proportionality) could end up being applied in another case.

Accordingly, whether an athlete can afford to fully and properly defend themselves is not solely an issue for that athlete or his sport – it ought to be a concern for all athletes in all WADA Code compliant sports, as well as those who claim to look after the interests of those athletes.

With that in mind, there is a compelling argument to be made for the creation of a central fund for the benefit of all athletes in all sports that form part of the WADA ecosystem – a kind of centralised body that acts as a counterweight to WADA and that is focused on protecting the rights of athletes who are involved in anti-doping proceedings.

But who would fill the coffers of such a central fund? In my view, the starting point has to be the same entities that fund the anti-doping machine; i.e. sports governing bodies and governments.

But why should they contribute? Fairness, for one thing:

(a)   Every athlete subject to anti-doping should have a real opportunity to fully and properly defend themselves. They ought not to be denied that opportunity merely because of the lottery of birth. If an athlete is eligible for anti-doping testing, they also ought to be given the means necessary to defend themselves if they do not have such means.

(b)   Greater equality of arms also ought to lead to more consistent caselaw, which would benefit the entire athlete population. That is because – as explained above – a decision in one sport has the potential to affect the outcome of another. Thus, if low-income athletes have access to better legal and scientific expertise, that ought to result in less difference between the outcomes of their cases and those involving wealthier athletes.

If those are not compelling enough reasons, then the following ought to be: the ever-increasing sensitivity of testing methods means that athletes are now often caught out by trace-level positives from contaminated supplements, food, water or sometimes even the environment in which they find themselves. For instance, four football players from two different teams in Norway were found last year to have ingested a prohibited stimulant whilst playing on an artificial football pitch layered with shredded tyre granulate, which itself contained the banned substance. In another recent case, a Chinese athlete tested positive for a medication that he passively inhaled after bringing a relative to a hospital for nebuliser treatment – in that case, the athlete was able to prove his case by obtaining CCTV footage from the hospital.

These are not cases of doping, but accidents that required long and costly investigations to explain.  The athletes in these cases were the “lucky” ones – they had the means to prove their innocence.  Many others under similar circumstances do not, and without such means, they face career-ending bans.

Anti-doping rules place the burden on athletes to identify the source of a positive test as a condition of establishing their innocence. Failing to do so can be fatal to an athlete’s defence. WADA has resisted reforms that might rebalance that position – for example, by introducing  thresholds and reporting limits that apply to a greater range of Prohibited Substances, to reduce the risk of positive tests caused by contamination. If the rules are not going to adapt fast enough, then fairness demands that the funders of the anti-doping machine provide athletes with the resources needed so that they at least have a chance of proving their innocence.

 

How much will it take?

There are approximately 2,000 positive tests each year. Of those, around 1,650 result in an anti-doping rule violation and sanction.

No system is likely to emerge overnight that is capable of funding every anti-doping case in the world. But if the aim is to create a system capable of meaningfully reducing the present inequality of arms, then the project must be grounded in the financial realities of modern anti-doping disputes. Proper legal representation, scientific investigation, expert evidence and appeals are expensive. Meaningful reform therefore requires meaningful funding.

Assuming that funding is directed towards a minimum of around 500 athletes who meet defined eligibility criteria, a central fund of approximately USD $25 million per annum would provide a meaningful starting point. That equates to an average of around USD $50,000 per funded case — a figure that would not necessarily cover every single angle that an exhaustive defence might, but which would go a long way towards enabling athletes to mount a proper and informed defence.  Some cases would require substantially more funding, and others less.

Of course, no central fund could realistically support every case. Clear rules would have to be adopted to govern how, when and where resources are deployed.  For example, priority might be given to (a) athletes who truly do not have the means to fund a defence; (b) cases which involve important points of principle; (c) cases which appear to be consistent with contamination; and/or (d) cases proceeding before the CAS (rather than first instance), etc.

It would also be advisable to set aside a portion of the funds to:

(a)   lobby for changes to the rules. Such changes would potentially impact the entire population of athletes by making the rules fairer and may thus – in the long term – be even more meaningful than fighting one case at a time.

(b)   create an up-to-date database of all anti-doping cases around the world that would allow athlete representatives to identify any patterns (for instance clusters of positive tests in particular jurisdictions or related to particular products) that may assist (i) athletes in establishing the source of a positive test; and/or (ii) preventing other athletes from inadvertent doping violations.

Irrespective of how the funds are split, $25 million equates to less than half of WADA’s annual budget (and a vastly smaller fraction of the budget of all ADOs combined), and so whilst it would not put athletes on an equal footing (at least not yet), it would be a good starting point.

 

Can sports afford to contribute to such a central fund?

WADA’s 2025 budget was USD $57.5 million. Fifty percent of its budget comes from the IOC while the other 50 per cent comes from the governments of the world. The IOC has reserves of almost USD $5 billion. The IOC alone, therefore, can afford to match the funds paid to WADA by contributing to a centralised athlete defence fund.

The governing bodies of sport, whose member athletes are the ones having to defend themselves in anti-doping proceedings, also ought to contribute. FIFA, for example, boasted reserves of almost $4 billion after a financially successful 2022 World Cup in Qatar.

World Aquatics’ 2023 financial statements showed financial reserves of USD $120 million, while World Athletics boasts almost $50 million in cash reserves.

Thus, between them, sports governing bodies (including the IOC) have more than enough financial clout to put an end to the financial unfairness of anti-doping proceedings. Sports may not relish the idea of funding the defence of athletes charged with an anti-doping rule violation, but contributing to such central funds would go a long way to making the system fairer.

While funding from governments and sports governing bodies would be an important step forward in the creation of any centralised defence fund, that should not be the end of the conversation.  Over time, the sustainability and effectiveness of such a fund will likely depend on its ability to draw on a broader range of capital. That might include, for example, supplementary contributions from private sponsors, philanthropic organisations and litigation funders willing to support meritorious cases (or groups of cases). In parallel, further engagement with the insurance market may, in time, yield products capable of covering at least part of an athlete’s defence costs.

 

Who would run a central anti-doping fund?

That question merits an article in its own right. However, for the purposes of this article, suffice to say that if a central defence fund were to succeed, it would require the participation of former athletes (ideally, some of whom will have been through the anti-doping process, such that they understand the key issues), representatives from athlete unions, and anti-doping experts.

The key point in terms of structure and personnel is that the central fund would have to be independent from the bodies that finance the present anti-doping regime. Without an arm’s-length governance model — for example, transparent eligibility criteria and binding restrictions on the ability of the sports governing bodies to influence which cases are funded — there is a real risk that contributors capture the institution and turn it into another arm of the regime it is meant to counterbalance.

 

Anticipating the obvious objections to a central defence fund

Objections will inevitably be raised against any proposal of this kind. For example:

  1. Does the promise of athlete funding not weaken deterrence? No. The proposal funds defence, not impunity. Athletes who in fact cheat will still be sanctioned; what changes is that those who did not cheat will have a better chance of clearing their names. A system that produces the right outcome is a better system, not a weaker one.
  2. Why should sport fund the defence of those accused of breaching the rules? Because those in charge wrote rules under which inadvertent contamination, or shoddy laboratory work, can end a career. If strict liability is to be the price of clean sport, the rule-makers must accept that athletes have the right to test the limits of those rules.  
  3. Why not just use AI to slash costs? AI may reduce costs at the margins – for example, assisting with basic legal research, translation and first drafts of submissions.

But, AI does not touch the expensive end of the problem: collecting samples, testing products, investigating contamination, obtaining CCTV or medical records, interviewing witnesses, or instructing experts. 

Athletes should also be cautious about relying on consumer AI tools to represent themselves. Such tools can hallucinate, miss legal or scientific nuance, and may create confidentiality or privilege risks (the latter risk being that an athlete using AI consumer tools may be waiving privilege in relation to the preparation their defence,  such that any material shared with the AI consumer tool may be disclosable).

It should be noted that even top of the range enterprise grade legal AI tools hallucinate and miss nuances of the science and the niche law applicable to anti-doping – and so their outputs should always be checked meticulously by counsel with anti-doping expertise. 

There will likely be a host of other objections, many of which will come from an anti-doping establishment that will not want to cede its dominant position. That is to be expected; an incumbent power rarely opens its arms to challenge.

Any project of this scale is likely to face challenges. That, however, is not a reason to avoid pursuing meaningful reform of a system that currently leaves many athletes without the resources needed to defend themselves properly.

 

Concluding remarks

The inequality of arms in anti-doping proceedings is the outcome of a system that funds prosecution but not defence; that empowers ADOs but leaves individuals to fend for themselves.

It has been this way for far too long.

Athletes need a new funding model to adequately defend themselves. If governments and sports governing bodies care about athlete rights, then they must give athletes more than empty promises about fairness. Athletes do not need more handbooks or athlete commissions. They need the tools to defend themselves. 

Governments and sports governing bodies may not move quickly. That should not prevent athlete unions, philanthropists and others interested in improving fairness within anti-doping from exploring ways to establish and support a central defence fund of the kind proposed here.

In parallel, there is an opportunity here for pioneering litigation funders and insurers to develop products capable of supporting at least part of the financial burden faced by athletes.

Ultimately, a better balance of power and resources ought to result in a fairer, and better, system for all athletes. That is surely something that any anti-doping regime should be striving for.  

 

Authored by 

Mike Morgan 
Managing Partner

Footnote

1. The UK minimum wage varies based on age, with the National Living Wage (for those 21 and over) being £12.71 per hour at the time of writing. For a 40-hour work week, this translates to an annual gross salary of approximately £26,400.          

2. It should be noted here that most experts with the requisite qualifications work within the WADA ecosystem and are contractually prohibited from assisting athletes with their defence.

3. Thresholds and Minimum Reporting Levels (“MRLs”) apply in respect of a limited number of prohibited substances.  If one of those substances is detected in an amount that falls below the Threshold or MRL, no anti-doping rule violation is deemed to have been committed. However, the list of Prohibited Substances that are subject to Thresholds or MRLs is narrow. The problem with that is that many of the Prohibited Substances that are not subject to Thresholds or MRLs can be contaminants in legitimate products/foods/medicines and can cause inadvertent positive tests. There are therefore good reasons as to why the list of Prohibited Substances that are subject to Thresholds and MRLs should be expanded.

4. See, for example, https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations/ which describes itself as “a database that tracks legal decisions in cases where generative AI produced hallucinated content”.

5. See, for example, UK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKUT 81 (Hamid)

6. Such specialist tool vendors admit that, despite their best efforts, even their products hallucinate – see, for example, https://www.harvey.ai/blog/biglaw-bench-hallucinations.